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Abstract– Generating secure random numbers is a central 
problem in cryptography that needs a reliable source of enough 
computing entropy. Without enough entropy available - meaning 
no good source of secure random numbers - a device is susceptible 
to cryptographic protocol failures such as weak, factorable, or 
predictable keys, which lead to various security and privacy 
vulnerabilities. In this paper, the author presents a significant 
improvement: a reliable way for any CPU-powered device - from 
the small, simple CPUs in embedded devices, to larger, more 
complex CPUs in modern servers - to collect virtually unlimited 
entropy through side channel measurements of trivial CPU 
operations, making the generation of secure random numbers an 
easy, safe, and reliable operation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Generating Random Numbers for Privacy and 
Security 
The ability to generate strong random numbers is 
essential to cryptography, and central to security and privacy 
in the IT world. For our encryption technologies to function 
as expected, we rely on cryptographically secure pseudo-
random number generators (CSPRNG) to actually produce 
high-quality random numbers suitable for cryptography. (For 
the purposes of this paper, “secure random number” will be 
used as shorthand to refer to “high-quality random number 
suitable for cryptography”; this refers mostly to how the 
random number was derived, and not any physical or 
inherent characteristic of any particular number itself) 
Having a computer system generate a secure random 
number is a difficult task due to the deterministic nature of 
computers. Although random-generating algorithms have 
long existed, such as linear congruential generators (LCG) or 
the Mersenne Twister, these are not CSPRNGs (i.e., not 
suitable for use in cryptography). Hardware-based random 
number generators (called TRNGs or True Random Number 
Generators) are a common solution, particularly for servers 
that require massive amounts of entropy. TRNGs typically 
measure quantum random properties such as nuclear decay, 
or classical random properties such as thermal noise or 
atmospheric noise. 
Being essential to security, some TRNGs have already 
made their way into CPUs themselves. VIA C3, released in 
2003, has a TRNG built-in marketed as the VIA Padlock RNG 
[7], [22]. Intel also baked-in a TRNG into their CPUs starting 
in 2011 with the release of the Ivy Bridge architecture. [15], 
[17] 
B. Appliances and Devices 
While traditional servers may consider the problem of 
generating secure random numbers solved due to easy 
access to TRNGs (a point I dispute in the next section), the 
world’s security infrastructure does not rest solely in the 
hands of these servers. Heninger et al [18], [19] found 
widespread factorable and duplicate TLS and SSH keys due 
to embedded devices suffering from “boot-time entropy 
hole”. This reveals a problem, mostly an economic/financial 
one, that also has to be solved: cheap devices and 
appliances do not have integrated TRNGs in them, and the 
resulting lack of entropy has caused a failure in their 
cryptographic protocols, which ended up producing 
thousands of duplicates of keys for TLS certificates in the 
wild and vulnerable RSA and DSA keys. 
Ideally, manufacturers or vendors should shell out the 
money to make sure their devices deal with entropy (or its 
shortage), equipping their devices or appliances with a 
TRNG somehow. In the real world, pragmatism tends to miss 
out, and if the added cost of including a TRNG does not make 
financial sense, manufacturers and vendors will continue 
selling vulnerable devices. 
A software solution here would be superior, especially if 
one can be applied cost-free (such as Open Source software) 
and the implementation is also simple and straightforward 
(i.e., not a significant burden to their existing development 
team) 
C. The problem with hardware-based TRNGs 
In late 2013, due to the Snowden revelations, the TRNGs 
that were integrated into the CPUs themselves – Intel’s 
DRNG and VIA’s Padlock RNG – have fallen into suspicion 
[11], [12]. 
Whether the NSA has truly backdoored these by 
compelling Intel / VIA is not the central problem. The real 
problem is that these implementations are effectively 
blackboxes and are impossible to audit, especially in a live 
environment (there’s no way you can actually audit the 
hardware circuit without destroying your CPU). For 
something so essential and central to cryptography and our 
security and privacy, we should not be depending on 
blackboxes. 
  
Hardware devices also eventually fail. Aside from possibly 
being open and auditable, an acceptable software solution 
is superior to TRNGs in this regard, since software does not 
go bad like hardware does. Hardware random number 
generators do come with safety and health checks, but this 
is not a total safeguard – TRNG failure can result in service 
interruption that lasts until the specific device is replaced, 
since the computer system relying on it may have no other 
source of secure random numbers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Shortcomings of the Current State of Secure 
Random Number Generation 
Being essential to cryptography and central to our 
security and privacy, the generation of secure random 
numbers was a topic that interested me. Over the Christmas 
holidays of 2017, I thought about this problem, looked at the 
existing alternatives, and decided that the current state is 
severely lacking and needs to be improved. Specifically: 
 
1) Reliance on hardware-based TRNGs must end or be 
mitigated – hardware devices effectively act as 
blackboxes, are impractical to audit in general, and 
next to impossible to audit within a live 
environment. Due to their blackbox nature, they 
are a natural target for nation-states and their 
intelligence apparatus. Whether the NSA / China / 
Russia has or has not backdoored (through trickery 
or coercion) any TRNG is not the real problem – the 
problem is that they have been given a target to 
backdoor due to widespread reliance on hardware 
random number generators that are next to 
impossible to audit.  
2) Current software solutions are lacking – software 
solutions either do not have enough theoretical 
backing, or are so complex that it makes them 
impractical to review and audit, and thus prone to 
suspicion; sometimes, both are true [2], [3], [4], 
[14]. There is also no solution currently available 
that is purposely designed as an architecture-and-
platform-agnostic heuristic. 
B. Timing Variability – the Benchmarker’s Bane 
Variability of benchmark runtimes has long been a bane 
for hardware reviewers, testers, researchers, developers, 
and most other users that rely on benchmark performance 
for key decisions (for example, whether a particular code 
change has actually sped up or slowed down a particular 
function). When measured with enough precision, 
benchmark runtimes can vary wildly, and are generally 
irreproducible. This applies to CPU benchmarks, GPU 
benchmarks, benchmarks of other hardware (hard disks, 
SSDs, etc.), and especially to benchmarks that combine 
many of these components. 
This was where I first started to imagine what would end 
up as the basis of the SideRand prototype – can CPU 
benchmark variability be used as the basis of entropy 
collection to generate secure random numbers? This 
presents itself as an interesting target for research and 
testing, since depending on variance of a benchmark 
runtime means using a side channel measurement, instead 
of the actual value of any mathematical operation which 
would be deterministic. If made to work, relying on a side 
channel measurement of a CPU would go a long way to solve 
the 2 problems mentioned in the previous section: 
1) Reliance on hardware TRNG will be removed or 
mitigated, since everything that has a CPU – from 
large servers to small embedded devices or 
appliances – can potentially benefit. 
2) This type of software solution, being based on a 
side channel, may survive cryptanalysis, since it 
does not depend on an algorithm that may produce 
cyclical output. 
C. CPU Variance 
Assuming for now that the timing variability can be made 
to collect enough entropy to be suitable for cryptography, 
one obvious shortcoming that needs to be addressed is the 
“same-CPU” weakness. That is, if one specific CPU (say, an 
Intel i7-7700K) produces 100,000 different unique runtimes 
for a specific benchmark (with the variations being 
measured in nanoseconds), can an attacker produce the 
same 100,000 unique runtimes (thereby potentially making 
the proposed side channel-based RNG predictable) if she 
buys the exact same CPU and runs the exact benchmark? 
This means a potential fatal weakness would simply be: “find 
out potential possible CPUs running in the target’s data 
center, buy these and make a table of potential values” 
Fortunately, the answer here is: CPU performance varies, 
even between two CPUs of the exact model, family and 
stepping. Researchers from Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, for example, published a 2017 paper detailing an 
empirical survey of the variation in performance and energy 
efficiency in their clusters of servers [5]. After characterizing 
the performance and energy efficiency of 4,000 CPUs, they 
found that no two processors had identical performance 
characteristics. This variation has not been improving (i.e., 
not becoming less pronounced) as CPUs become more 
modern; instead, from Sandy Bridge (2nd generation Intel 
Core architecture) to Ivy Bridge (3rd generation) to Broadwell 
(5th generation), the variation in performance has increased 
between processors of the same model, family and 
stepping. In a nutshell, since no two CPUs perform 
identically (given enough precision in measurement), relying 
on a side channel measurement based on benchmark 
runtime is not trivially exploitable by merely purchasing the 
same CPU model. 
III.  DESIGN OF SIDERAND 
A. Fundamental Design Notes 
I developed SideRand based on the variability of 
benchmarks. Its design is guided by the principle I call 
auditability – making the code as simple as possible to make 
auditing very easy. The evolution of SideRand prototypes, 
from the first attempt (designated as “mark 1” or “mk1”), 
  
until the final prototype version (currently, SideRand mk10), 
can be reviewed at the author’s SideRand site: 
http://research.jvroig.com/siderand. (A full discussion of each 
step of the evolution, however, is outside the scope of this 
paper. Notes about the evolution can be found in the 
SideRand site as supplemental information.) The mk1 to 
mk10 prototypes were developed in Python 3. This included 
the essential part of entropy collection (the aggregation of 
timing information from trivial CPU operations), plus the 
part that uses the entropy collected to produce actual 
random bits (a generic hash operation, specifically SHA256).  
Once the final Python 3 SideRand prototype proved itself 
in internal testing, I created a new prototype, this time using 
the C language to test the theory using a compiled language. 
This prototype was more widely tested than the Python 3 
prototypes. The rest of the paper deals exclusively with the 
C version of the SideRand prototype and its results on a 
plethora of different CPU types. This prototype is meant only 
to test the entropy collection portion (particularly to show 
that even compiled executables will show enough 
benchmark variability compared to its interpreted 
counterpart), and so it only has the entropy collection part, 
and does not have the hashing component present in the 
Python 3 prototypes before it. 
B. SideRand C Prototype 
Two versions of the SideRand prototype were done in C: 
one using the normal clock() timer from time.h, and one 
using the nanosecond-level timer clock_gettime(), also 
provided by time.h. The source code is published below, as 
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. 
 
ALGORITHM 1: SideRand C – normal clock() timer 
 
    #include <stdio.h> 
    #include <time.h>   
    int main() { 
        int i=0; 
        int j=0; 
        int samples = 256; 
        int scale = 5000000; 
        int val1 = 2585566630; 
        int val2 = 576722363; 
        int total = 0; 
        double times[samples];  
 
    for(i=0; i<samples; i++) 
    { 
        clock_t begin = clock(); 
        for(j=0; j<scale; j++) 
        { 
            total = val1 + val2; 
        } 
        clock_t end = clock(); 
        double time_spent = (double)(end - begin) / 
CLOCKS_PER_SEC; 
        times[i] = time_spent; 
        printf("%f\r\n", times[i]); 
    } 
    return 0; 
} 
 
Algorithm 1 shows the source code (<30 line, including 
headers and bracket lines) of the SideRand C entropy 
collection version using the normal clock() timer. Given my 
focus on auditability, you’ll note how simple and 
straightforward the code is. It’s just a loop of a trivial 
addition operation, which we time repeatedly with a chosen 
timer (in this specific case, the clock() function). We collect 
the timing information in an array. In total we are getting 256 
samples, i.e., 256 timing values. The complete array, with its 
sequence of timing information, is our collected entropy. 
For more modern Linux distributions (Ubuntu and Fedora, 
for example), clock() has microsecond-level precision. For 
Windows and older, more conservative, enterprise-type 
Linux distributions (RHEL, CentOS), this has only millisecond-
level precision, and unsuitable for our needs. An improved 
prototype is shown in Algorithm 2, which uses available 
nanosecond timer, clock_gettime() instead. 
 
ALGORITHM 2: SideRand C – nanosecond timer 
 
    #include <stdio.h> 
    #include <time.h> 
 
    struct timespec timer_start(){ 
        struct timespec start_time; 
        clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, 
&start_time); 
        return start_time; 
    } 
 
    long timer_end(struct timespec start_time){ 
        struct timespec end_time; 
        clock_gettime(CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, 
&end_time); 
    long t_nanos = (end_time.tv_sec - start_time.tv_sec) * 
(long)1e9 + (end_time.tv_nsec - start_time.tv_nsec); 
        return t_nanos; 
    } 
 
    int main() { 
        int i=0; 
        int j=0; 
        int samples = 256; 
        int scale = 5000000; 
        int val1 = 2585566630; 
        int val2 = 576722363; 
        int total = 0; 
        long times[samples];  
 
        struct timespec t_start; 
        long time_spent = 0; 
     
        for(i=0; i<samples; i++) 
        { 
            t_start = timer_start(); 
            for(j=0; j<scale; j++) 
            { 
  
                total = val1 + val2; 
            } 
            time_spent = timer_end(t_start); 
            times[i] = time_spent; 
            printf("%ld\r\n", times[i]); 
        } 
        return 0; 
    } 
 
This prototype with the nanosecond-level timer is only 
trivially longer at 42 line, still including headers, blank lines 
and bracket lines. The algorithm is essentially unchanged – 
a trivial addition operation is looped several times, timed 
using the nanosecond-level timer. The timing info is 
aggregated into an array, which becomes our collected 
entropy. 
IV. TESTING AND ENTROPY ANALYSIS 
A. “The Entropy Source We Deserve, But Not the 
One We Need Right Now”  
The output of any random number generator cannot be 
used directly as proof of its suitability as a source for secure 
random numbers. Fortunately, our cryptographic protocols 
also do not require that the source is true randomness. 
Instead, cryptographically secure random number 
generators merely need to be sufficiently unpredictable and 
have a ridiculously large key space (set of possible outputs) 
such that brute-force attacks are infeasible within the 
applicable threat-model. To paraphrase Gordon in “The Dark 
Knight (2008)”, “True randomness is the entropy source we 
deserve, but not the one we need right now.”  
The C prototype was deployed to several machines, and 
the output (timing information) was collected in CSV files. 
All tests were triggered with niceness set to -20 (i.e., highest 
priority).  These files were then processed in order to find 
out how many unique timing values were collected, and the 
exact frequency distribution. Knowing these two things – 
number of unique values and their frequency - allows us to 
effectively model the minimum entropy in the system that 
we are able to collect. 
B. Key Space 
Several different machines were used to run the SideRand 
C prototype.  The raw results, as well as the tool itself for the 
reader’s own testing or inspection, can be found in the 
SideRand website linked to in section III. In summary, the key 
space analysis shows that the runtimes measured can have 
thousands of unique values, which depend largely on CPU 
speed, available timer resolution, and the software stack. 
Using the nanosecond timer boosts unique values to over 
100,000 unique values. 
With thousands of potential values and with the raw 
random output (i.e., the value that will be hashed) being a 
chronological sequence of 256 of these values (i.e., the 
specific order they were collected in, not sorted in any way), 
that gives a ridiculous upper limit of ~1,000 ^ 256 (clock() 
timer) or ~100,000 ^ 256 (clock_gettime() timer). This is the 
potential upper bound. It’s the stuff that the wild 
imaginations of a crypto-nerd (such as yours truly) are made 
of. However, this potential key space will be greatly affected 
by predictability – it doesn’t matter if there is an 
unimaginably large set of possible values if, in practice, there 
are really only a handful of values that appear 99.999% of 
the time.  To determine this, we need to analyze the 
frequency distribution of the runtime values. 
 
C. Frequency Distribution 
Unique timing values were tabulated according to how 
often they appeared (frequency), and the % of time they 
appeared was calculated (number of appearances of a 
unique value, divided by the total number of timing values 
collected). All experimental results (raw and processed, in 
CSV and spreadsheet form) are available in the SideRand 
website linked to in section III as supplementary 
information. 
In summary, for most modern x86-64 computers, even 
just the microsecond-level timer resulted in the most 
frequent (repeating) timing value to occur less than 1% of 
the time. Using the nanosecond-level timer resulted in this 
figure going down to less than 0.001%.  
The worst case was found, predictably, in smaller, less-
complex CPUs (particularly, in-order-execution 
architectures). SideRand C was tested in a Raspberry Pi 3 
board (ARM Cortex A53 CPU), and an old Intel 
“Diamondville” Atom 330 CPU (circa 2008). For the Cortex 
A53, the microsecond timer resulted in the most frequent 
value appearing 14% of the time, compared to 17% of the 
time for the Diamondville Atom CPU. Using the nanosecond 
timer, the Cortex A53 had the most frequent value 
appearing 1.29% of the time, compared to only 0.02% of the 
time for the Diamondville Atom. 
D. Modeling System Entropy – Minimum Entropy 
Estimate Based on Most Frequent Value 
Modeling the entropy accurately based on raw timing 
values and frequency distribution is a challenge that I’ll 
reserve for more enthusiastic statisticians. For now, all we 
need is to model a conservative minimum entropy estimate 
– something reasonable that is sure to be lower than what 
the actual entropy would be. If even that worst-case 
estimate of the minimum entropy meets our standards, then 
we don’t have to care anymore about what a better, more 
accurate entropy estimate is.  
One way we could model the minimum computational 
entropy is to simply consider the most frequent value that 
appears. For example, let’s imagine a data set that has a 
most frequent value (MFV) that appears 20% of the time. 
We are guaranteed at least 5 possible states of equal 
probability (states = 100%/MFV), since all other values can 
only be less than or equal to 20%. A minimum of 5 equally 
possible states means ~2.32 bits of entropy per 
measurement (bits = log2(states)). Since we’re stringing 
along 256 of these measurements, that gives us at least 594 
bits of entropy for this theoretical system.
  
Table I. Some selected, representative results of the SideRand benchmarks, showing different classes of CPUs. 
 
CPU 
 
Arch 
Out-Of-Order 
Execution 
 
OS 
Timer  
Precision 
 
MFV 
Entropy  
(bits) 
Avg Time  
(seconds) 
Cortex A53 (RPi 3) ARM No Raspbian Nanosecond 1.29154% 1,606.34 ~13.00 
Cortex A53 (RPi 3) ARM No Raspbian Microsecond 14.22320% 720.30 ~13.00 
Intel Atom 330  x86 No Ubuntu 16.04 Nanosecond 0.02388% 3,070.23 ~5.7 0 
Intel Atom 330 x86 No Ubuntu 16.04 Microsecond 16.83393% 656.80 ~5.70 
AMD E350 x86 Yes Ubuntu 17.04 Nanosecond 0.00036% 4,624.72 ~8.50 
AMD E350 x86 Yes Ubuntu 17.04 Microsecond 0.12555% 2,467.21 ~8.50 
Pentium G3260 x86 Yes CentOS 7.5 Nanosecond 0.06435% 2,714.06 ~2.75 
Pentium G3260 x86 Yes CentOS 7.5 Microsecond 7.94430% 935.41 ~2.75 
i7 7700K x86 Yes Fedora 25 Nanosecond 0.00049% 4,511.94 ~2.80 
i7 7700K x86 Yes Fedora 25 Microsecond 0.15527% 2,388.75 ~ 2.80 
For a cryptographically secure seed, the standard to meet 
is an entropy of at least 256 bits (approximately 
1.15x10^77), from which can be derived an unlimited 
number of keys using deterministic cryptography [8], [9], 
[10]. 128 bits of entropy was suggested by the IETF in 2005 
[13]. To be more conservative, this paper will consider 256 
bits as the standard to shoot for. 
Experimental data gathered, as described in sections IV-B 
and IV-C, result in complete overkill. While we need only 256 
bits of entropy, most modern x86-64 CPU architectures end 
up collecting over a thousand bits of entropy in a single run 
of the SideRand C prototype, even with just the 
microsecond-level timer. Using the nanosecond-timer, these 
CPUs collect between 3 to 5 thousand bits of entropy in a 
single run. Examining the worst cases – the Intel 
Diamondville Atom and the ARM Cortex A53 CPUs, using 
only the microsecond-level timer – still gives us well in 
excess of 650 bits (Diamondville Atom) or 720 bits (Cortex 
A53) in a single run.  
Table I shows a summary of representative results from 
these experiments. The “CPU” column identifies the specific 
CPU model. The “Arch” column identifies the architecture of 
the CPU (either ARM or x86). The “Out-Of-Order Execution” 
column marks whether the CPU is an out-of-order execution 
architecture (“Yes”) or not. “OS” identifies the OS used in the 
experiment. The “Timer Precision” column indicates the 
precision of the timer used. The “MFV” column reports the 
Most Frequent Value % found – that is, the frequency (in %) 
of the value that repeated the most (e.g., a 2% MFV means 
the most frequent value accounted for 2% of the entire data 
set, and all other values have a <=2% frequency). The 
“Entropy (bits)” column shows the bits of entropy gathered, 
based on the MFV, as described earlier in this section. 
Finally, the “Avg Time (seconds)” column reports the average 
runtime of SideRand in the given platform. 
 
 
 
 
V. WHERE THE VARIANCE COMES FROM 
It may be worthwhile at this point to mention why this 
runtime variance between benchmark runs exists. 
Modern CPUs contain millions to billions of transistors – 
even the ARM Cortex-A9, released over ten years ago (2007), 
has an estimated 26 million transistors. These transistors 
that make up a CPU are not perfectly uniform (as truly 
nothing humans create ever are, when measured with 
enough precision), and transistor variability has long been 
something that CPU designers cope with, such as designing 
for the worst case (guard-banding). Aside from transistor 
variability itself, there are also systematic variability (caused 
by manufacturing, with CPU binning as a common coping 
strategy) and local variability (random dopant fluctuation) 
[21]. These factors make CPUs unique from each other, even 
those that come from the same wafer and binned as the 
exact same model, family and stepping. CPU enthusiasts, 
especially overclockers, refer to this as the “silicon lottery”. 
This variation between CPUs that are sold as identical is 
not getting better (smaller). As the LLNL team found in [5], 
this variance has only increased with more recent 
processors (e.g., Broadwell microarchitecture compared to 
Ivy Bridge microarchitecture). The reason for this is the 
improvement in dynamic frequency scaling features in most 
CPUs – whereas these “turbo” features in multi-core 
architectures used to be very blunt (a fixed frequency if only 
1 core is operating, a slightly lower fixed frequency with an 
additional core operating, etc), current implementations 
from Intel, AMD and ARM-based processors offer turbo-like 
features with smarter capabilities that take into account 
estimated current consumption, estimated power 
consumption, and processor temperature (respectively, 
Intel Turbo Boost Technology 2.0, AMD SenseMI / Extended 
Frequency Range, ARM DVFS technology)  [1], [6], [16] . 
These variances that stem from the transistor level also 
affect repeated runs of the same physical CPU. Execution of 
the same instruction and data won’t take the exact same 
path each time – i.e., each run would not be using the exact 
  
same transistors (be they transistors in the CPU registers, 
cache, or execution units). The physical location of the data, 
for example, also results in runtime variance due to latency 
differences – one run, for example, may have the data on 
physically one end of the cache, whereas the other run may 
have the same data on the other end of the cache. These 
variations can be as small as nanoseconds or fractions of 
nanoseconds. 
Aside from the practical, real-world consideration of 
needing a CPU and platform that offers reasonable timer 
resolution, the only way that this side channel-based secure 
random number generation heuristic will fail is when our 
technology is able to do two magical things: 
1) Create perfectly uniform transistors. 
2) Fabricate a complex processor that contains billions 
of these perfectly uniform transistors without 
introducing any manufacturing variations (i.e., a 
perfectly uniform, flawless, manufacturing process) 
Additionally, CPUs would have to be designed so that 
performance is not dynamic (no more temperature, current, 
voltage, and workload-based dynamic frequency scaling). 
Until we reach this level of technology, which does not 
seem to be on the horizon, and CPUs somehow revert back 
to having non-dynamic performance scaling features, the 
proposed side channel-based heuristic is likely to remain a 
good candidate for ubiquitous secure random number 
generation across all our CPU-powered devices. 
VI. POTENTIAL IMPACT, USE CASES AND LIMITATIONS 
Primarily, I envision SideRand as an open and auditable 
way for operating system kernels or hypervisors to seed their 
RNG. Initial seeding during OS installation or first boot is a 
problem that still needs solving [10], which has led to the 
vulnerabilities that Heninger et al have discovered [19]. 
While SideRand is easily extendable to be a general purpose 
CSPRNG, I’m not very concerned about that right now; there 
are already great CSPRNGs around, we just need to solve the 
problem of initial seeding – creating that first 256-bits of 
entropy in order for all these CSPRNGs to do their job 
properly. Being auditable also means that the very core of 
our cryptographic security – initial seeding and random 
number generation – is strengthened against potential 
backdoor attempts by nation-states. 
For servers, SideRand can serve as a replacement for 
TRNGs. This greatly improves auditability, as SideRand is 
easily auditable (in its current implementations, around 40 
lines of code), whereas TRNGs are impossible to audit in live 
environments. This will also serve to improve reliability. 
Hardware eventually fails, even known good hardware, 
whereas known good software does not, and software is far 
easier to patch in live environments compared to swapping 
out hardware in case of eventually discovered defects or 
needed tuning.  
One run of SideRand can replace or complement the 
entropy collector and random seeder in servers, devices and 
appliances that would otherwise have poor entropy, solving 
the problems encountered by Heninger et al [19]. A single 
run of SideRand can produce a key, from which an unlimited 
number of keys can then be derived using standard 
deterministic cryptography, such as using the SideRand-
produced key as the nonce or initialization vector to a block 
cipher in counter mode (e.g. AES-256-CTR) [9]. 
Headless or embedded devices that previously suffer 
from “boot-time entropy-hole” can run SideRand during 
boot for a few seconds to produce the needed strong key, 
and from there generate secure random numbers using 
traditional cryptography, such as the aforementioned 
construction of a secure block cipher in counter mode. 
Since target devices may range from large servers to small 
devices with micro-controllers like Arduino or RaspberryPi, 
tuning issues will matter. All experimental results shown in 
this paper are overkill – from 2.5x to 18x more than the 256 
bits of entropy needed. This means tuning for SideRand to 
run faster without sacrificing security is feasible by making 
the SideRand algorithm collect less samples. 
Platforms that have lower timer resolution than 
microseconds (milliseconds and higher) have not been 
tested. These platforms may not be able to collect enough 
entropy through the SideRand heuristic within a practical 
time. These sorts of platforms should be extremely rare 
though – even Arduino devices have microsecond-level 
timers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I presented SideRand, a heuristic and prototype for 
generating secure random numbers based on the inherent 
variability of benchmark runtimes, with its worst-case 
entropy estimate shown to far exceed the required entropy 
in order to be considered cryptographically secure. 
Experimental data from various platforms (different CPU 
architectures, operating systems, and timer precisions) have 
shown that the heuristic works to provide strong 
cryptography to practically all types of devices, from small, 
embedded systems to large servers. Effectively, this closes 
the boot time entropy-hole found by Heninger et al [18], 
[19]. The simplicity of the entropy gathering code serves to 
deter nation-state actors from backdooring OS RNG seeding. 
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